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What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field
Abstract: This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals
who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of selfinterest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism.
We test whether an econometric summary of subjects’ strategies is consistent with one of these
motivations using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in three
regions of Colombia. As expected, average extraction levels are less than that predicted by a
model of pure self-interest, but are nevertheless sub-optimal. Moreover, we find that a model of
conformism with monotonically increasing best response functions best describes average
strategies. Our empirical results are inconsistent with models of altruism, reciprocity and
inequity aversion.
JEL Classification: C93, D64, H41, Q20
Keywords: common pool resources, experiments, altruism, reciprocity, conformism
1. Introduction
There is substantial evidence that models of purely self-interested Nash behavior usually fail to
explain individual behavior in situations in which private and social interests diverge, such as
public good provision or common pool resource extraction. Several theories have emerged in an
attempt to explain why individual choices differ from those predicted by self-interested Nash
behavior. Many of these explanations are based on the assumption that individuals are motivated
by a combination of both pure self- interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity,
inequality aversion, or conformism. Although there is a significant theoretical and experimental
literature on theories explaining non-selfish behavior, to date there has been no study that
develops a unified theoretical framework to discriminate among these competing models.
Moreover, much of the literature focuses on models of reciprocity and altruism, but conformism
has been given little attention.
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who
extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a mix of self-interest and other
motivations. In addition to a model of purely self-interested behavior, the other motivations that
we consider are:
1. Altruism. Individuals have utility functions that include a positive weight on the payoffs
of others.
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2. Reciprocity that is conditioned on the expected resource extraction of others. In this
model individuals place a positive weight on the payoffs of others when they expect
others’ extraction choices to not exceed their own, and a negative weight on the payoffs
of others when they expect others’ extraction choices to exceed their own.
3. Inequity aversion is similar to reciprocity, but individuals condition their choices on how
their payoffs compare to the payoffs of others. Individuals place a positive value on the
payoffs of others when they do not exceed their own, but they place a negative value on
the payoffs of others when they do exceed their own.
4. Conformism. Individuals bear an internal penalty when their own choices deviate from
the average choices of the others.
Using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in rural Colombia, we
test whether an econometric summary of subjects’ strategies is consistent with one of these
motivations.
Our models of altruism and reciprocity are adapted from the models developed by Levine
(1998) and Bowles (2003). Our model of reciprocity generates a similar Nash best response
function to that generated by Falk et al. (2002), who adapted Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) notion
of inequity aversion to the common pool resource problem. We model conformism in a way that
is similar to Luzzati (1999) and Bowles (2003), although Bowles calls this motivation ‘guilt’.
Each of these motivations, when combined with pure self-interest, generates a unique Nash best
response function. We estimate individual extraction choices as a function of the individuals’
expectation about the choices of the other group members. This yields a summary of individual
best response functions that we then use to determine which motivation best explains average
choices in our subject pool.
The common pool resource experiments were framed as an extraction decision from a
community-owned natural resource. The experiments were conducted in three regions of
Colombia in communities that are highly dependent on the extraction of a shared natural
resource. Thus, the participants regularly face a social dilemma in their everyday lives similar to
that presented in the experiment. Therefore, it is likely that participants’ prior experiences with
common pool resources and similar social dilemmas may influence their preferences and choices
in a way that is not controlled by the experiment (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004).
During an experiment, groups of five participants played 10 rounds of an open access
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game.1 Individuals payoffs were derived from a conventional model of common pool resource
exploitation. Each round, subjects were asked to decide how much to extract from a shared
resource. In addition, participants were also asked to provide their expectation of the aggregate
level of extraction they anticipated that the others would choose in the current round. With data
on both individual choices and the expectations about the aggregate choices of others, we
estimate best response functions that are conditioned on an individual’s expectation of the
choices of the other four group members.2
As expected, we find that average extraction levels lie between that predicted by a model
of purely self-interested behavior and that which would maximize group earnings. This result is
consistent with individual strategies that balance self-interest and other factors. Our theoretical
model suggests that the best response functions for individuals motivated by reciprocity or
inequity aversion are not necessarily monotonic and will have segments that are downwardsloping. Altruistic preferences yield a monotonically decreasing best response function, and
conformism suggests that the best response function will be monotonically increasing if
conformism dominates pure self-interest.
Because the best response functions may be non-monotonic, we estimate a spline
regression of individual extraction choices as a function of the expectations of what the others in
their group will extract. Our estimation results indicate that the best response function is nondecreasing for relatively low levels of others’ extraction, and is strictly increasing for mid to high
levels of others’ extraction. This suggests that a model of conformism best characterizes average
strategies. We emphasize that our results do not suggest that all individuals are solely motivated
by conformism, and not by altruism, reciprocity, or inequity aversion; only that an empirical
summary of individual strategies reveals that conformism is dominant.
Our approach and results differ from similar studies in significant ways. Fischbacher,
Gachter and Fehr (2001) analyze individuals’ contribution schedules given the average
contribution level of the other group members in a public good experiment. They graph the
individual strategies of 44 participants and show that about half of the subjects are ‘conditional
cooperators’, which they define as individuals who are willing to cooperate the more others
1

Each group played 10 additional rounds with different treatments involving combinations of communication and
regulatory control. These additional data are not included in the present analysis.
2
We should note an important caveat at this point. Strictly speaking, the models of Nash strategies that we develop
apply to static common pool games, while our experiments clearly placed subjects in a dynamic environment. Thus,
our results should be interpreted with this qualification in mind.
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cooperate. Kurzban and Houser (2005) use a statistical-type classification algorithm to
empirically assign individuals to one of three types in a public good experiment. Their algorithm
identifies 20% of their subjects as free-riders, 13% as cooperators (altruists) and 63% as
reciprocators or conditional cooperators.
Here, we focus on an econometric estimate of individuals’ strategies and the summary it
provides. Moreover, we have been able to distinguish between reciprocity and conformism as
possible causes for conditional cooperation as previously identified by Frey and Meir (2004).
Interestingly, Bardsley (2000) argues for the need to also distinguish between these alternative
motivations in public goods provisions, which is exactly what we have accomplished in the
context of a common pool resource experiment.
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) survey the experimental evidence of ultimatum, dictator,
public goods, and gift exchange games (among others) and argue that many experimental results
can be explained by individual preferences for fairness and reciprocity. Our results suggest
otherwise. Moreover, this literature fails to discriminate among other possible models,
particularly conformism. In general, economists have been less interested in conformism as a
motive driving individual behavior, although some have considered conformism in the context of
public goods games. Luzzati (1999) provides a theoretical model of conformism in these
situations. Carpenter (2004) provides experimental evidence that conformism could actually
increase free-riding in public goods games. In contrast, our experiments suggest that conformism
leads to more conservative exploitation of common resources.
The evidence explaining individual choices in common pool resource games is quite
limited. Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) reported results of common pool resource
experiments conducted in rural villages of Colombia that are not consistent with the conventional
Nash equilibrium levels of extraction. However, they did not attempt to attribute individual
behavior to alternative preferences. Casari and Plott (2003) formulate a model of other regarding
preferences that includes altruism or spite as alternatives to pure self-interest. From a pool of 32
subjects they found that about one third are other regarding, and these are predominantly spiteful.
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2002) developed a theoretical explanation of behavior in common
pool resource games by using Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion and the
empirical regularities reported in Walker, Garden and Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, Walker and
Garden (1992). Our results challenge Falk et al’s focus on inequity aversion and Casari and

5

Plott’s focus on spite by suggesting that conformism is a better summary of individual behavior
in open access problems.
Our results have profound implications for the understanding of individual behavior in
the commons, and for the design and evaluation of government interventions to promote more
efficient use of common pool resources. We stress the importance of the conformism motive and
the role that it plays in producing outcomes that are more efficient than conventional Nash
equilibria. Moreover, our results make it clear that policies based on conventional individual
self-interests will not be appropriate when conformism is a more important motive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the theoretical
models of pure Nash strategies under alternative sets of preferences. The third section focuses on
the experimental design and the fourth section presents our econometric results. The last section
concludes.
2. Models of Self-Interest, Altruism, Reciprocity (Inequity Aversion), and Conformism
In this section we present models of pure Nash strategies when individuals are motivated by selfinterest, and self-interest combined with altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism.
Each of these alternatives generates best response function with distinct characteristics. Our
experiment design and econometric estimations allows us to test for these characteristics.
2.1 Self-Interested Nash Strategies
The benchmark model for our study is the standard problem of individual extraction from a
common pool resource by n individuals. The model is static and is similar to models presented
by Ostrom et al. (1994), Falk et al. (2002), and an earlier model developed by Cornes and
Sandler (1983).
Individual i extracts xi units up to a capacity constraint ximax . Units of extraction sell at a
constant price p. The individual’s extraction costs are c ∑ i = 1 x i + dx i ∑ i =1 x i , where c and d
n

n

are positive constants. Define x−i = ∑ j ≠i x j , and write i’s extraction costs more compactly as

c ( x i + x − i ) + dx i ( x i + x − i ). These components of the cost function capture the social dilemma
of the model in which dxi ( xi + x− i ) captures the cost externality that is typical of common pool
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resource problems, while c( xi + x− i ) captures negative externalities that reduce individual
existence or non-use values. The individual has an endowment ei.
Given the extraction of others, the individual’s self-interested extraction choice is
determined by maximizing:
[1]

π

i

= e i + p x i − c ( x i + x − i ) − d x i ( x i + x − i ) , subject to xi ≤ ximax .

Throughout we will let π i denote individual i’s monetary payoff. Since π i is strictly concave in

xi, the following Kuhn-Tucker condition is necessary and sufficient to identify a solution to [1]:
[2]

p − c − 2 d x i − d x − i ≥ 0, if > 0, x i = x im a x .

Letting [2] hold with equality and solving for xi yields the unconstrained best response function:
[3]

xˆ is ( x − i ) = ( p − c − d x − i ) / 2 d .

The superscript s denotes the strategy of a purely self-interested individual. Incorporating the
capacity constraint gives us the individual’s best response function:
[4]

x is ( x − i ) = m in [ xˆ is ( x − i ), x im a x ].

Each subject received the same payoff table generated from [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c =
17.875, d = 2.75 ei =900 and ximax = 8 . Figure 1 graphs xˆis ( x− i ) and xis ( x− i ) using these
parameters. Let x−i = ∑ j ≠i x j /(n − 1) represent the average extraction choices of the other group
members, where n = 5. The function xi = x− i defines the set of choices in which individual i’s
extraction choice equals the average extraction of the others up to the group and individual
capacity constraint (32,8). The intersection of xi = x− i and xis ( x− i ) at (24,6) is the standard
symmetric Nash equilibrium. It is easy to show that if all individuals extract a single unit, then
joint payoffs are maximized.
7

2.2 Other Regarding Preferences: Altruism, Reciprocity and Inequity Aversion

Models of altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion reflect a balance between self-regarding
and other regarding preferences. In that case, individual i places a value on the payoffs of others.
Suppose individual i’s utility is given by:
[5]

ui = π i + β i ∑ j ≠i π j .

Following Levine (1998) and Bowles (2003), β i can be specified to capture both altruism and
reciprocity motives as follows:

[6]

 α i + ρi+ , if xi ≥ x− i
β i = β i ( xi − x−i ) = 
−
α i − ρi , if xi < x− i ,

where α i , ρi+ , and ρi− are positive constants. We construct β i in this way to guarantee that all
best response functions are piecewise linear. The value α i is the altruism parameter; it is the
marginal value that i places on the utility of the other players and is independent of their choices.
In contrast, the reciprocity motive implies that the weight that the individual places on the
payoffs of others is conditioned on their choices. An individual places a positive value, ρ i+ , on
the payoffs of others when she expects that their average extraction will not exceed her own, and
a negative weight, − ρi− , on their payoffs when she expect their average extraction to exceed her
own.
Upon substitution of [1] for each individual into [5] we have:

[7]

u i = ei + p xi − c ( xi + x − i ) − d xi ( xi + x − i )
+βi

(∑

j≠i

)

e j + p x − i − ( n − 1) c ( x i + x − i ) − d x − i ( x i + x − i ) .
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Maximizing ui with respect to xi ≤ ximax requires:

[8]

∂ u i ∂ x i = p − c − 2 d x i − d x − i − β i [ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] ≥ 0 , if > 0 , x i = x im a x .

Note that ∂ 2ui ∂xi2 = −2d < 0, which indicates that ui is strictly concave in xi; thus, [8] is
necessary and sufficient to identify a best response to x-i. The solution to [8] with a non-binding
capacity constraint is:

[9]

xˆ iβ ( x − i ) =

( p − c − dx

−i

− β i [ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] ) / 2 d

= xˆ is ( x − i ) − β i [ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] / 2 d ,

where xˆis ( x− i ) is defined by [3]. Upon substitution of [6] we have:

[10]

 xˆ iβ + ( x − i ) = xˆ is ( x − i ) − (α i + ρ i+ )[ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] / 2 d , fo r x i ≥ x − i
xˆ i ( x − i ) =  β −
s
−
 xˆ i ( x − i ) = xˆ i ( x − i ) − (α i − ρ i )[ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] / 2 d , fo r x i < x − i .
β

Incorporating the capacity constraint yields the individual’s best response when she is motivated
by a combination of altruism, reciprocity, and pure self-interest:

[11]

x iβ ( x − i ) = m in [ xˆ iβ ( x − i ), x im a x ].

2.2.1 Altruism
We first consider an individual that balances altruism and self-interest when choosing her
extraction, and does not engage in reciprocal behavior. Ignoring the capacity constraint for a
moment, set ρi+ = ρi− = 0 in [10] to obtain xˆiβ ( x− i ) = xˆiα ( x− i ) = xˆis ( x− i ) − α i [dx− i + (n − 1)c] / 2d .
Incorporating the capacity constraint ( ximax = 8 ) gives us the best response function for this
individual, x iα ( x − i ) = m in [ xˆ iα ( x − i ), x im a x ]. Note that xˆiα (0) = xˆis (0) − α i (n − 1)c / 2d < xˆis (0)
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and ∂xˆiα ( x− i ) ∂x−i = ∂xˆis ( x− i ) ∂x− i − α i d 2 < ∂xˆis ( x− i ) ∂x− i . 3 These relationships reveal that when
an individual balances altruism and pure self-interest, her unconstrained best response function
lies below and is more steeply downward-sloping than her unconstrained best response function
if she were purely self-regarding.
In Figure 2 we have used xˆiα ( x−i ) and the capacity constraint to graph a representative
best response function, xiα ( x−i ) , for an individual that balances an altruism and pure self-interest.
We assume that the capacity constraint is binding in this case for relatively low levels of
extraction by the other individuals, but this need not be the case if the altruism motive is strong
enough. Except for the capacity constraint, the individual will always choose lower levels of
extraction than if she was purely self-interested. Moreover, if she does not extract up to the
capacity constraint, then her extraction will be declining in her expectation of what others will
extract. Therefore, if altruism is a dominant motive, an econometric analysis of individual
extraction choices should generate a best response function that is non-increasing and that has a
strictly decreasing segment.
2.2.2 Reciprocity
Now consider an individual that is not motivated by altruism, but rather by a combination of
reciprocity and self-interest. Again, ignoring the capacity constraint for the time being, substitute

α i = 0 into [10] to obtain

[12]

 xˆ ρ + ( x ) = xˆ is ( x − i ) − ρ i+ [ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] / 2 d , fo r x i ≥ x − i ;
xˆ iρ ( x − i ) =  iρ − − i
s
−
 xˆ i ( x − i ) = xˆ i ( x − i ) + ρ i [ d x − i + ( n − 1) c ] / 2 d , fo r x i < x − i .

With the capacity constraint the individual’s best response is x iρ ( x − i ) = m in [ xˆ iρ ( x − i ), x im a x ].
To derive the characteristics of xiρ ( x−i ) we need to examine how xˆiρ + ( x−i ) , xˆiρ − ( x− i ) , and
xˆis ( x− i ) are related. From [12] we have:

3

It is possible that the altruism motive is so strong that xˆiβ (0) = 0, but we ignore this possibility, because it implies
that xˆiβ (0) = 0 for all x− i .
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[13.a]

xˆ iρ + (0 ) = xˆ is (0 ) − ρ i+ ( n − 1) c / 2 d < xˆ is (0 );

[13.b]

xˆiρ − (0) = xˆis (0) + ρi− (n − 1)c / 2d > xˆis (0);

[13.c] ∂xˆiρ + ( x− i ) ∂x− i < ∂xˆis ( x− i ) ∂x− i < ∂xˆiρ − ( x− i ) ∂x− i .

These relationships indicate that xˆiρ + ( x−i ) lies below and is more steeply sloping downward than
xˆis ( x− i ) , while xˆiρ − ( x− i ) lies above and has a greater slope than xˆis ( x− i ) . In fact xˆiρ − ( x− i ) may
have a positive slope if the negative reciprocity motive is strong enough. Figure 3 graphs
xˆis ( x− i ) , and possible xˆiρ + ( x−i ) and xˆiρ − ( x− i ) . The heavy dashed line is the individual’s best
response function, xiρ ( x−i ) , when she is motivated by a combination of pure self interest and
reciprocity. This function combines xˆiρ + ( x−i ) for xi ≥ x− i , xˆiρ − ( x− i ) for xi < x− i , and the capacity
constraint.4
Like the model of altruism, the best response function for a reciprocator may lie along the
capacity constraint for relatively low levels of the expected extraction of others, but there must
also be a strictly decreasing segment. In this segment, the individual’s extraction exceeds her
expectation of what others will extract. In a sense, she rewards the others for their restraint by
extracting less than if she were purely self-interested. After this declining segment of the
function her best response function is monotonically increasing along xi = x− i , indicating that her
extraction exactly equals the average of what she expects others to extract. For significantly
higher levels of extraction by the others, the individual ‘punishes’ the others by extracting more
than if she were purely self-interested. Although our graph indicates a declining segment of the
best response function for very high extraction levels of the others, if the punishment motive is

4

To show that xiρ ( x− i ) = x− i in its third segment from the left, consider a pair ( xi0 , x−0i ) in this segment, where
xi0 = x−0i /( n − 1). To show that xi0 is a best response to x−0i , suppose instead that some xi1 < xi0 is a best response to
x−0i . Note that xi1 < x−0i /(n − 1) . However, using [12] min[xˆiρ − ( x− i ), ximax ] is the best response for all xi < x−i /(n − 1) .

Since at a point like ( xi0 , x−0i ) , min[xˆiρ − ( x− i ), ximax ] > xi0 > xi1 , some xi1 < xi0 cannot be a best response to x−0i . Now
suppose that some xi2 > xi0 is a best response to x−0i . Note that xi2 > x−0i /( n − 1) , but for all xi ≥ x−i /(n − 1) ,
min[xˆiρ + ( x− i ), ximax ] is the best response as long as xˆiρ + ( x−0i ) ≥ 0 . In Figure 3 note that at a point like ( xi0 , x−0i ) ,

min[xˆiρ + ( x− i ), ximax ] < xi0 < xi2 , which indicates that xi2 > xi0 cannot be a best response to x−0i . Since higher or lower
extraction levels than xi0 = x−0i /( n − 1) cannot be a best response to x−0i , xi0 must be.
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strong enough, then this will not occur and the best response function will continue along
xi = x− i up to the group and individual capacity constraint (32,8).
If reciprocity is a dominant motive in our subject pool, then our estimation results should
yield a non-monotonic regression that may lie along the capacity constraint for relatively low
levels of expected extraction by others, but is strictly decreasing and lies above xi = x− i for
somewhat higher levels of others’ extraction, and then follows xi = x− i for mid to higher levels
of the expectation of others’ extraction. The strictly increasing segment and the level of
extraction for very high extraction levels of others are the characteristics that distinguish the
reciprocity from altruism motives.
2.2.3 Altruism and Reciprocity
Deriving an individual’s best response function when she is motivated by a combination of
altruism, reciprocity and self-interest is more involved, but nevertheless has a similar structure as
the best response function in Figure 3. In this case the best response function lies below xiρ ( x−i ) ,
due to the inclusion of the altruism parameter α i , except when it lies on the xi = x− i locus, and
possibly at the capacity constraint for low expected levels of others’ extraction. This implies that,
except when the capacity constraint binds, the best response function has a strictly declining
segment at first and then a strictly increasing segment along xi = x− i . How the function behaves
for higher expected extraction of others depends on the relative importance of negative
reciprocity and altruism.
2.2.3 Inequity Aversion
Our model of reciprocity and pure self-interest generates a best response function that is similar
to that generated by the model of inequity aversion presented by Falk et al. (2002). They adapted
Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) notion of inequity aversion to the common pool resource problem.
An individual’s utility function is assumed to be

[14]

ui = π i −

ρi+
n −1

∑ max{π i − π j , 0} −
j ≠i

ρi−
n −1

∑ max{π
j ≠i

12

j

− π i , 0},

where as before ρi+ and ρi− are positive constants. In this model subjects are averse to
differences in payoffs among individuals, with disadvantageous differences being more heavily
weighted than advantageous differences ( ρi− > ρi+ ). Falk et al. (2002) demonstrate that this
model produces a best response function that has similar characteristics to our model of
reciprocity.

2.4 Conformism

If individuals are motivated by conformism, then they prefer not to deviate much from others’
choices. We model conformism as an internal penalty an individual faces when her choices
deviate from the average expected choices of others. This is very similar to the approach Luzzati
(1999) used to adopt the conformism concept to explain voluntary contributions to public goods.
It is also similar to Bowles’ (2003) concept of “guilt” that an individual experiences when he of
she deviates from the choices of others. A key difference between conformism and reciprocity is
that when individuals are motivated by conformism, their actions are conditioned on the
expected choices of others; they are not evaluating the payoffs of others. Suppose individual i’s
utility is given by:

[15]

ui = π i − γ i ( xi − x− i ) 2 / 2.

Maximizing [15] without the capacity constraint, xi ≤ ximax , yields the individual’s unconstrained
best response function:

[16]

xˆ iγ ( x − i ) =

p − c − d x − i γ i x − i /( n − 1)
+
.
2d + γ i
2d + γ i

Incorporating the capacity constraint yields the individual’s best response when she has a
preference for conformance, x iγ ( x − i ) = m in [ xˆ iγ ( x − i ), x im a x ].
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To compare an individuals’ best response when she balances conformism and simple selfinterest to her best response when she is motivated solely by self-interest, note from [3]
that 2 d xˆ is ( x − i ) = p − c − d x − i . Therefore, we can rewrite [16] as

[17]

xˆ iγ ( x − i ) = xˆ is ( x − i )

γ x /( n − 1)
2d
+ i −i
.
2d + γ i
2d + γ i

From [17] we have

xˆ iγ (0 ) = xˆ is (0 )
and

2d
< xˆ is (0 ),
2d + γ i

∂ xˆ iγ ( x − i ) ∂ x − i = ( ∂ xˆ is ( x − i ) ∂ x − i )

γ /( n − 1)
2d
+ i
> ∂ xˆ is ( x − i ) ∂ x − i .
2d + γ i
2d + γ i

Thus, xˆiγ ( x− i ) has a lower intercept than xˆis ( x− i ) , but a greater slope. In fact, if the conformism
motive is strong enough, xˆiγ ( x− i ) may be upward sloping.5 In general, the conformism motive
can produce several best response functions with different characteristics. However, all such best
response functions are monotonic except when the capacity constraint is binding. This
distinguishes the conformism motive from reciprocity, mixed altruism and reciprocity, and
inequity aversion.
4. Experiment Design

Our experimental design is similar to that of Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis (2000). Subjects
were placed into groups of five and participated in a ten-period common pool resource game.6
Subjects sat facing away from each other and were not allowed to communicate. Payoffs were
calculated using [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c = 17.875, d = 2.75 and ei = 900 presented as
a table (see the appendix for the experiment instructions, including the payoff table).7 In each

5

This requires γ i /(n − 1) > d .
Assignment to groups was not completely random. We tried to ensure that relatives were in separate groups.
7
For the experiments in the field, the participants were asked to choose a level of extraction between 1 and 9 units,
instead of between 0 and 8 units. The reason of doing this is that the concept of zero extraction is very difficult to
6
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round, subjects were asked both their extraction choice and their expectation about the extraction
choice of the other group members.8 After all subjects had made their decisions, the monitor
collected this information and announced the aggregate level of extraction. With this
information, individuals were able to calculate both the actual level of total extraction by the
others and their own payoffs given the others’ decisions.
The experiments were conducted in three regions of Colombia (Magdalena Region,
Pacific Coast and Caribbean Coast) in communities in which the primary activity is artisanal
fishing. Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the subject pool. Over three-quarters of the
subjects were male fishermen. Subjects also had relatively low levels of education (mean 5.5
years) with an average age approaching 39.
A total of 420 individuals (140 per region) participated in these experiments with average
earnings of 15,340 pesos per person (about US$6) during the summer of 2004. Daily wages in
these regions averaged 10,000-15,000 pesos. Earnings were paid in cash at the end of each
experiment. Each experiment lasted about three hours. Before each experiment began,
instructions were read aloud by the monitor and several practice rounds that did not count toward
final earnings were played to familiarize the participants with the experiments.
These field experiments were conducted with subjects who face the same kind of social
dilemma about the exploitation of local natural resources in their everyday lives as the dilemma
modeled in the experiments. Therefore, it is likely that participants’ prior experiences with
common pool resources may influence their preferences and choices in a way that is not
controlled by the experiment (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004). Moreover, many subjects knew each
other from daily interactions. Thus, it is possible that their decisions were affected by these
relationships.
5. Experimental Results and Analysis

Table 2 presents some summary statistics of individual extraction and the expected and actual
extraction of others. The mean individual level of extraction was 4.6 units, but the purely selfinterested Nash equilibrium prediction is that each individual would extract six units. We also
explain in the field since the participants depend so critically on the extraction of local natural resources. The payoff
table they were given was modified to account for this.
8
Croson (1998) also asked subjects about their expectations about the choices of the other group members and
compensated them based on the accuracy of their prediction. In our experiments, earnings were based solely on the
individual’s extraction choice and were not affected by her prediction of others’ choices.
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calculated individual differences between their actual choice and their purely self-interested best
response given their reported expectations of what others would do. Not surprisingly, on average,
subjects did not pursue self-interested Nash strategies as suggested by a two-unit average
deviation from their purely self-interested Nash best responses.
Individuals’ expected levels of extraction by others in their group were significantly
different from others’ actual extraction. In fact, as shown in Table 2, individuals tended to be too
optimistic about others’ extraction9. On average, individuals expected that the other four
members of the group would extract 15.4 units, 2.9 less units their actual extraction. This
difference was greater in the last period, when individual’s expectation of the others’ extraction
was 3.8 units lower than their actual extraction.
Identifying the existence of individual deviations from purely self-interested Nash best
responses functions is the first step towards understanding the motivations driving individual
behavior. Random effects Tobit models were used to estimate summaries of individual best
response functions and test the theoretical models explained in section 3. The use of random
effects models responds to the nature of our experimental data in which repeated observations
are obtained from each individual. Also, the Tobit models account for the censored nature of our
data since individual decisions were constrained to be between 0 and 8 units. Moreover, since
our theoretical development yielded piece-wise linear best response functions, we estimated
spline functions which allow the slope of the regression to vary in different intervals of the
expected extraction of others but imposes continuity on the estimated regression.
Our regression results are reported in Table 3. Model 1 is a spline regression that divides
the range of individuals’ expectation of the extraction levels of the other group members,
denoted x−e i , into four-unit intervals. Recall that for our models of pure self-interest alone and for
self-interest combined with altruism, reciprocity or inequity aversion individual best response
functions could exhibit a flat segment at the capacity constraint of eight units for relatively low
levels of expected extraction of others, but that each must have a monotonically decreasing
segment. In contrast, we estimate a summary best response function that is flat and significantly
below the capacity constraint (the estimate of the constant is 2.46) for x−e i < 8 , and then is
monotonically increasing as the expected extraction of others increases. Thus, we reject the

9

Croson (1998) also reports that 33% of her subject pool exhibited over optimism when predicting other’s behavior.
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hypothesis that pure self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or combinations of
these motives can explain average behavior in our experiments.
Instead it appears that the model of conformism best describes average strategies in our
experiments. Our model of linear conformism generates a Nash best response function that is
monotonic except possibly at the capacity constraint. Moreover, if the conformism motive is
strong enough the function is monotonically increasing. Except for the flat segment for low
levels of expected extraction by others, which we will revisit shortly, this is exactly what our
empirical results indicate. This result is consistent with the notion of conditional cooperation as
an explanatory feature of individual behavior. However, we move forward from that concept by
identifying that conformism, instead of reciprocity, is the most important motive driving
conditional behavior in our subject pool.
As discussed by Carpenter (2004), the conformism motive could generate less
conservative outcomes than predicted by the model of pure self-interests. That is, subjects could
conform to similarly high levels of extraction. Recall that in our case, mean levels of individual
extraction were well below the conventional Nash prediction (see Table 2). Thus, in our subject
pool, it appears that the conformism motive leads to a more conservative (though not efficient)
exploitation of the commons.
The spline function estimated in Model 1 was useful to test for any changes in the slope
of the regression. However, the coefficients obtained for each interval suggest that the expected
extraction of others could be partitioned into fewer intervals. The first two intervals of Model 1
show positive coefficients that are not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the rest of
the intervals have coefficients that are statistically greater than zero, but they are not significantly
different from each other. The null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal to each
other cannot be rejected (Wald test, p = 0.59). This leads us to Model 2 which includes just two
intervals, 0 ≤ x−e i < 8 and 8 ≤ x −e i ≤ 32 . The results show statistically positive slope coefficient in
both intervals, indicating that the function is monotonically increasing. However, the slope
coefficients are statistically different (p = 0.03) which may suggest a nonlinearity that our
theoretical model of conformism does not explain.
We also investigated whether our fundamental results varied by region. In each model,
we included dummy variables to capture regional effects, none of which are statistically
significant. Note that in Model 3, we estimated a simple linear relationship between individual
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extraction and their expectations of the extraction of others in their group; that is, we did not
partition the expected extraction of others into intervals. This allows us to interact the regional
dummy variables with the expected extraction of others, but these interactions are also not
significant.
In each model we also included the period as an explanatory variable to capture the effect
of time on individual choices. In all cases, individual extraction is increasing as the experiment
proceeds. This is consistent with results that others have found in games of social dilemmas;
namely, high levels of cooperation in the first rounds of these experiments, but declining
cooperation rates over time (Fehr et al., 2002)
Finally, we also examined the effects of individual characteristics such as age, gender and
years of education.10 As is evident in Table 3, age and gender are not significant in explaining
individual choices. The coefficient for education is positive and highly significant in each of our
models. It is possible that the more educated individuals may be better able to identify the purely
self-interested Nash strategy and use this to their advantage. This result could suggest that those
with lower levels of education who are unsure about what to choose might use the decisions of
others as a source of information to guide their decisions (Smith and Bell 1994). Moreover, they
may simply try to ensure that their choices roughly conform to what the rest of the group is
doing.
6. Conclusions

We have developed and tested several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract
from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a mix of self-interest and altruism,
reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformism. Using data generated from common pool
experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia, we estimated individual extraction choices
as a function of their expectation about the choices of the others in their experiment. An
econometric summary of individual strategies strongly suggests that self-interest, altruism,
reciprocity and inequity aversion are not the primary motivations in our subject pool. Rather, our
results suggest that the conformism motive best explains average strategies in our experiments.

10

420 individuals participated in our experiment. However, by including age, gender and education as explanatory
variables we lost the observations of 15 individuals from whom we did not have this information.
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Moreover, it appears that conformism works to generate outcomes that are more efficient than
that predicted by a model of pure self-interest.
Of course, we do not claim that our results suggest that all the subjects were primarily
conformists; only that conformism best explains average strategies. It is quite probable that there
are individuals in our subject pool who are better described as self-interested, altruists, or
reciprocators. Therefore, the next step in this research project is to characterize individual
strategies rather than average strategies. This will allow us to investigate how the composition of
individual motivations produces outcomes. This would be similar to the work of others in the
context of public goods games (e.g. Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001, and Kurzban and
Houser 2005). Notably, this kind of analysis has been not conducted for common pool games,
much less in the field with direct users of common pool resources.
Furthermore, it may be fruitful to formulate dynamic strategies under alternative
motivations and analyze our data in light of these strategies.
It is clear that alternative individual motivations will have profound impacts on the
design of policies to manage common pool resources. Because of this future research should also
consider the effects of different institutions on outcomes in the presence of alternative motives.
Indeed, institutions may affect preferences as suggested by several authors including Cardenas,
Stranlund and Willis (2000) and Frey and Jegen (2001). Thus, examining the interactions
between preferences and institutions appears to be a fruitful area for new research.
Finally, although we found that our main conclusion about the importance of the
conformism motive did not vary across the three regions we visited, one should stop short of
concluding that this result is likely to be robust to differences in contexts. Additional research in
this area is needed to generate comparable results across subjects in different environments.
Ultimately, a sufficient number of similar studies would allow us to draw conclusions about what
motivates common pool resource users across the developing world.
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Figure 1: An Individual’s Self-Interested Nash Strategy
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Figure 2: Balancing Altruism and Pure Self Interest.
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Figure 3: Balancing Reciprocity and Self-Interest.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of subject characteristics

Region

Mean Age

Mean number of years
of formal education

Number of
Males

Number of
Females

Magdalena
Pacific
Caribbean
All Regions

41.3
39.9
34.6
38.6

4.8
5.4
6.4
5.5

119
123
65
307

21
17
75
113

Table 2: Summary statistics of individual extraction and the extraction of others
Variable

All rounds

Last round

Mean Level of extraction

4.6

4.8

Mean Deviation From SelfInterested Best response

2.5

2.3

Mean Expected Level of
Extraction of Others

15.37

15.38

Mean Actual Level of
Extraction of Others

18.32

19.14
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Table 3: Random effects Tobit models of individual best responses
MODEL 1
2.46
(0.45)***
0.07
(0.62)
0.04
(0.05)
0.17
(0.04)***
0.09
(0.04)**
0.12
(0.04)***
0.10
(0.50)**
0.17
(0.06)***
0.16
(0.07)**

Constant
0 ≤ x−e i < 4

4 ≤ x−e i < 8
8 ≤ x−e i < 12
12 ≤ x−e i < 16

16 ≤ x−e i < 20
20 ≤ x−e i < 24
24 ≤ x−e i < 28
28 ≤ x−e i < 32

MODEL 2
2.48
(0.43)***

MODEL 3
2.32
(0.43)***

0.06
(0.02)***
0.13
(0.007)***

0 ≤ x−e i < 8
8 < x−e i ≤ 32
x−ei

Period

0.11
(0.01)***
0.04
(0.01)***

0.03
(0.01)***

0.03
(0.01)***

-0.06
(0.21)
0.08
(0.21)

-0.05
(0.21)
0.08
(0.21)

-0.38
(0.30)
-0.06
(0.29)
0.02
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.006)
0.04
(0.20)
0.10
(0.03)***
447.96***

-0.00
(0.006)
0.04
(0.20)
0.10
(0.03)***
444.74***

-0.00
(0.006)
0.06
(0.20)
0.10
(0.03)***
441.92***

Regional Effects

Pacific
Magdalena

Pacific × x−ei
Magdalena × x−ei
Individual Characteristics

Age
Gender =1 if female
Education (years)
Wald χ2

The dependent variable is the individual’s level of extraction, xi. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis. * reflect p-values: * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01.
Number of observations = 4050. Number of subjects = 405.
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Appendix: Instructions 11
Introduction
The exercise in which you are going to participate can be different from other exercises in which
members of your community might have participated in the past; therefore, any comments that
you might have heard about the exercise does not necessarily apply to the version in which you
will participate.

This exercise is similar to a situation in which a group of people has to make decisions on how to
use a community owned natural resource. For example, a forest, a drinking water source, or a
fishing area.
You have been selected to participate in a group of 5 people. Today, there are 3 groups
participating at the same time. However, each group is independent and the decisions of the other
groups do not affect the decisions of your group. Each group will be differentiated by the color
of the sheets used during the exercise.
In this exercise you will earn money depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other
members of your group. The reason why we use money in this exercise is to represent real life
situations in which your economic decisions will bring yourself monetary consequences. You
will play several rounds equivalent, for example, to periods such as years, months, or fishing
seasons.
In each round, you will earn a number of points that will be equivalent to a number of pesos. At
the end of the exercise, we will sum the total number of pesos earned in all the rounds, we will
round the total earned, and we will personally hand that to you in cash.
We will now explain how to participate in the exercise. Please pay a lot of attention to the
instructions. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to make better decisions in the
exercise. Please, remain seated and do not speak with other participants. If you have a question,
raise you hand. The assistant will answer your question in private.
Earnings Table
We will now hand out the EARNINGS TABLE which contains all the information you will need
to make your decisions in this exercise.

All participants have the same EARNINGS TABLE that you do. The numbers in the table are
points equivalent to the pesos you can earn in each round, depending on both what you decide to
extract and the decisions made by others in your group.
In each round you have to decide how many units of the resource you will extract. We will call
your decision “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION.” These units correspond to the columns 1 to 9
in the EARNING TABLE. In this exercise, each participant can extract a maximum of 9 units,
and a minimum of one.
11

Juan Camilo Osorio translated the instructions from Spanish to English.
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In the EARNINGS TABLE, the decisions of the other members of your group correspond to the
column “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which will be a number between 4 and 36.
This number is the sum of the units extracted by the other members of the group. When you
make your decision, you will not know the decisions made by the other members of your group.
Once all participants hand in their decisions, we will sum all the levels of extraction and will
announce the group’s TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION. With this information you will be
able to calculate the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL
LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”.
Let’s see some examples so that you can understand how to use the EARNINGS TABLE.
Imagine you decide that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 units, and that the other
members of the group extract 4 units each. We will announce that the TOTAL level of
extraction is 20 units. Since you decided to extract 4, you can calculate the “LEVEL OF
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”
minus your level of extraction. In this case, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is
20 – 4 = 16 units. Thus, as seen in the table, your earnings will be 859.
In the previous example all the members of the group picked the same level of extraction.
However, each person can pick a different number. For example, if you choose 4 and the other
members of the group extract 2, 3, 7 and 8, we will announce that the TOTAL level of extraction
is 24. Given the fact that you decided to extract 4, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF
OTHERS” will be 20. In other words, the total level of extraction (24) minus your level of
extraction (4). In this case, as seen on the table, your earnings will be 754.
The EARNINGS TABLE has an additional table called “Average of the others”. This column
indicates you the average decision of your group for a determined level. For example, if the
others extract 8, this means that the average amount extracted per person is 2. Instead, if the
others extract 20, the average amount extracted per person is 5.
Take a few seconds to look at the EARNINGS TABLE and understand how it works. If you have
any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to you.
Decision Card
I will now explain how you will inform us in each round your level of extraction. In each round
you will receive a “decision card”. The decision cards are these small pieces of paper.

In each round you will have to write:
- The number of the round, which will be announced by us.
-“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”, in other words, how many units will you extract, which in
this case will be a number between 1 and 9.
-You also have to write what you think the other members of your group will extract.
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This is the sum of the levels of extraction that you think the other 4 members of your group will
extract. This sum is a number between 4 and 36. Remember that when you make your decision
you do not know what the others are choosing. However, we want to know how much you think
the others will extract. For example, if you think that two people will choose 3 and the other two
5, then, what you think the others will extract is 16 (3 +3+ 5 + 5).
What you write on the level of extraction of others will not affect your earnings, either if it is
equal or different to what actually happened. However, we are interested to know what you are
thinking about the level of extraction of the others when you make your choice.
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, we will pick up the 5
participants’ cards and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction. Once we announce the
total extraction of the group you will be able to calculate the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION
OF OTHERS.” With this information and your level of extraction, you will be able to calculate
how much you earned by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE.
It is very important that you remember that your decisions are private and that you can not show
them to the other members of the group. We will only announce the TOTAL level of extraction.
Calculations sheet
Each one of you will receive a calculations sheet with which you record your decisions and
earnings. Please write your participant number in the calculations sheet. This is the same number
that is written in the decision cards.

Let’s see how to use the calculations sheet by looking at an example. Suppose you decided to
extract 4 units. In consequence, you have to write 4 under column A of the calculations sheet, as
shown in the example. You should also write this number in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”
in the Decision Card .You are writing your decision in two places, in the Decision Card, which
you will hand in back to us, and in the calculations sheet. Please, check that you have written the
same number in the two sheets before you hand in the decision card.
After all the members of the group have finished taking their decisions, we will pick up the cards
of the 5 participants and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction.
Suppose the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 20 units. You should write 20 in the
column B in the calculations sheet. In order to calculate accurately the “LEVEL OF
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” you should subtract Column A (“MY LEVEL OF
EXTRACTION”) from Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”). You should write
the result in Column C (“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”). In our example, the
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is 16 (20 – 4.)
In order to calculate your earnings, you should use the EARNINGS TABLE. In this case, given
that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 and the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”
is 16, then your earnings will be 859. This is the information you should write in column D.
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Practice rounds
Before we begin the exercise we will do some practice rounds. The decisions that you take in
these practice rounds would not affect your earnings today.

The first practice round will be done altogether. First, write the number of the round in the
decision card, in this case (P) of practice. After that, looking at the EARNINGS TABLE suppose
that each one of you picked 5. Write this in the decision card and in Column A of the earnings
sheet. You should also write in the decision card what you think the other members of your
group will extract. In this case, it is 20, because we know that all of them picked 5. Remember,
when we begin the real exercise, you will not know the exact number of extraction of the other
members while you will be picking your level of extraction. In the next rounds you will write
what you think the others will extract.
Given that all the members of the group picked 5 in this example, the total level of extraction for
the group is 25. Each one should write now 25 under Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF
EXTRACTION”) in the calculations sheet.
Now subtract “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (5) from the “TOTAL LEVEL OF
EXTRACTION” (25). In other words, column B minus Column A. This operation is equal to 20.
This number is the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which you should write in
Column C. Using the number in Column A, “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION,” and the number
under column C, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, you should use the earnings
table to determine your earnings for this round. In this case, your earnings will be 790. Write
your earnings in column D.
We did this example and the previous one supposing that everyone picked the same level of
extraction. However, when you make your decision, you may choose the level of extraction that
you want by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE. Are there any questions?
Let’s continue with the next practice round. First, write down the round’s name in the decision
card, in this case (P) of practice. Now, each one of you has to decide your level of extraction
using the EARNINGS TABLE. Write it down in the decision card and in Column A in the
calculations sheet. Before you hand in the decision card, check that the number in column A is
equal to the one you wrote in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” in the decision card. You
should also write in the decision card the level of extraction that you believe the other members
of the group will extract.
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EARNINGS TABLE
Level of
extraction
of others
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

My level of extraction
1
900
882
864
846
829
811
793
775
757
739
721
703
686
668
650
632
614
596
578
560
543
525
507
489
471
453
435
417
400
382
364
346
328

2
996
976
955
934
914
893
873
852
831
811
790
769
749
728
708
687
666
646
625
604
584
563
543
522
501
481
460
439
419
398
378
357
336

3
1087
1064
1040
1017
994
970
947
923
900
877
853
830
807
783
760
736
713
690
666
643
620
596
573
549
526
503
479
456
433
409
386
362
339

4
1172
1146
1120
1094
1068
1042
1016
989
963
937
911
885
859
833
807
780
754
728
702
676
650
624
598
571
545
519
493
467
441
415
389
362
336

5
1252
1223
1194
1165
1137
1108
1079
1050
1021
992
963
934
906
877
848
819
790
761
732
703
675
646
617
588
559
530
501
472
444
415
386
357
328
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6
1326
1295
1263
1231
1200
1168
1137
1105
1073
1042
1010
978
947
915
884
852
820
789
757
725
694
662
631
599
567
536
504
472
441
409
378
346
314

7
1395
1361
1326
1292
1258
1223
1189
1154
1120
1086
1051
1017
983
948
914
879
845
811
776
742
708
673
639
604
570
536
501
467
433
398
364
329
295

8
1458
1421
1384
1347
1310
1273
1236
1198
1161
1124
1087
1050
1013
976
939
901
864
827
790
753
716
679
642
604
567
530
493
456
419
382
345
307
270

9
1516
1476
1436
1396
1357
1317
1277
1237
1197
1157
1117
1077
1038
998
958
918
878
838
798
758
719
679
639
599
559
519
479
439
400
360
320
280
240

